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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

THE CIVILIAN AND THE WAR POWER
THE war is raising many constitutional problems of the
most -far reaching importance, all of which may perhaps be
grouped under the single question: What is the reach of the
war power? The purpose of this paper is by no means so
ambitious as to attempt an answer to that question: it is rather
to inquire into the nature of the war power with respect to the
rights of civilians, and specifically with respect to the jurisdiction of military tribunals over persons not members of the
military or naval service.
The war power in the United States rests upon as secure
a constitutional foundation as any other of the great powers
of sovereignty. The express grants are too familiar to need
quoting.' But over and beyond these specific grants rises the
*towering fact that the United States is a nation; that under
the constitution a sovereign state has arisen endowed-at least
so far as the war-power is concerned-with all the inherent
powers of national sovereignty not withheld by the constitution. Mr. Justice Strong, writing the opinion of the Supreme
Court and speaking of the early amendments to the constitution restricting the powers of the government, 2 says:

"They tend plainly to show that in the judgment of those
who adopted the constitution there were powers created by it
neither expressly specified nor deducible from any one specified
power or ancillary to it alone, which grew out of the ,aggregate
of power conferred upon the government or out of the sovereignty instituted."
And Mr. justice Bradley in the same case declares boldly
that "The United States is not only a government, but it is a
1 Const. U. S., Art. I, Sec. 8, pars. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18; Sec. 10,
pars. 1, 3.
2 Legal Tender Cases, (1870) 12 Wall, 535, 20 L. Ed. 287. See also
opinion of Gray, J., in Juilliard v. Greenman, (1884) 110 U. S. 421, 28
L. Ed. 204, 4 S.C. R. 122.
This theory of "inherent powers of sovereignty" as a test of the
powers of the National Government, is vigorously opposed by Justice Brewer in Kansas v. Colorado, (1907) 206 U. S..46, 51 L. Ed. 956, 27
S. C. R. 655, and is regarded by Professor Willoughby as not only
"constitutionally unsound," but as "revolutionary." Willoughby, Constitutional Law, II, Sec. 38. But when properly understood, and con-

THE CIVILIAN AND THE WAR POWER

national government, and the only government in this country
that has the character of nationality. It is invested with power
over all the foreign relations of the country, war, peace,
negotiations and intercourse with other nations; all of which
are forbidden to the state governments." And he draws the
conclusion that the government "is invested with all those
inherent and implied powers which at the time of adopting the
constitution were generally considered to belong to every government as such, and as being essential to the exercise of its
functions." He declares that it is absolutely essential to the
independent national existence that the government should
have a firm hold on the two great sovereign instrumentalities
of the sword and the purse, and the right to wield them without
restriction on occasions of national peril.
It is of course true that the war power comes into play only
in time of war; in peace it is latent; but when the time arrives
for its exercise, whatever is within the scope of the war power
is as much authorized by the constitution as any other of the
great governmental functions. It is a mere fallacy to say that
inter arma leges silent means military dictatorship. If, in the
exercise of the war power, individual rights which clash with it
are suspended, such suspension is authorized by the constitution and is not a violation of it.
Light may be thrown upon the relation of the war power
to the constitution by considering the relation of the constitution to the treaty-making power. This power like the war
power is expressly granted; and the treaties made "tinder the
fined within proper limits, it does not seem to the author inconsistent
with the fundamental conception of the federal government as one of
enumerated powers. In its international relations-and certainly war
is one of these-the government of the Union is national. Professor
Willoughby recognizes this: "Starting from the premise that in all
that pertains to international relations the United States appears as
a single sovereign nation, and that upon it rests the constitutional
duty of meeting all international responsibilities, the Supreme Court
has deduced corresponding federal powers. In Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, [149 U. S. 696. 13 S. C. R. 1016, 37 L. Ed. 905] that Court says:
'The United States are a sovereign and independent nation, and are
vested by the constitution with the entire control of international relations, and with all the powers of government necessary to maintain
that control and to make it effective.' " Likewise, the power of eminent domain, nowhere expressly granted, must be conceded to the federal -overnment as a necessary incident of sovereignty. "The right is
the offspring of political necessity; and it is inseparable from sovereignty, unless denied to it by its fundamental law." Strong, J., in
Kohl v. United States, (1875) 91 U. S. 367. 23 L. Ed. 449.
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authority of the United States" are declared to be part of the
supreme law of the land; but when we look for some definition of the scope of the treaty-making power it is to be found
only in the inherent nature of sovereignty. Every war ends in
a treaty, and the fruits of the war, whether of victory or disaster, are expressed in the treaty of peace. Hence the two
powers are inextricably blended together as the supreme expressions of the national sovereignty. No constitution, in the
last analysis, can limit either the one or the other, because the
right and the duty of the government to protect the life of the
state must of necessity be paramount over all other rights and
duties. For the purposes of this discussion it is not necessary,
however, to carry the point to that extent; it is only necessary
to assert that the United States possesses the war power and
the treaty-making power in as full and perfect a degree as
any other sovereign state except in so far as it is limited by the
terms of the constitution itself. The states are expressly
excluded from both fields. Either the war power-in its entirety
is vested in the government of the United States, or so far as
not vested cannot be exercised at all, and the United States,
unlike other sovereign states, is obliged to fight with its hands
tied.
With respect to the treaty-making power the Supreme
Court has said :3
"The treaty-making power, as expressed in the constitution,
is in terms unlimited except by those restraints which are
found in that instrument against the action of the government
or of its departments, and those arising from the nature of
the government itself and of that of the states. It would not
be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the
constitution forbids, or a change in the character of the government, or in that of one of the states, or a cession of any portion
of the territory of the latter, without its consent. But with
these exceptions, it is not perceived that there is any limit to
the questions which can be adjusted touching any matter which
is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country."
But if the treaty-making power embraces the right to
acquire territory by purchase or as the result of a successful
war (as was said by Bradley, J., in Mormon Church v. United
a Geofroy v. Riggs, (1890) 133 U. S. 258, 33 L. Ed. 642, 10 S. C. R.
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States4 ), it cannot be doubted that it extends to the cession of
territory in case of defeat in war; and it is difficult to resist
the conclusion that the president and senate might by treaty
transfer any of the outlying dependencies to a foreign country
even in time of peace: This latter power has indeed been
expressly conferred upon congress by the constitution, 5 but
there is no reason to think that the treaty-making power is
incompetent to do so when the terms of the treaty are dictated
by a victorious enemy.
The line of cleavage between state and federal power is
totally ignored in the exercise of the treaty-making power, as
Mr. Root has conclusively shown :6
"The treaty-making power is not distributed; it is all vested
in the national government; no part of it is vested in or reserved to the states. In international affairs there are no
states; there is but one nation, acting in direct relation to and
representation of every citizen in every state. . . . It is
of course conceivable that under pretense of exercising the
treaty-making power, the president and senate might attempt
to make provisions regarding matters which are not proper
subjects of international agreement, and which would be only
a colorable-not a real-exercise of the treaty-making power;
but so far as the real exercise of power goes, there can be no
question of state rights, because the constitution itself, in the
most explicit terms, has precluded the existence of any such
question."
When state laws excluding aliens from the ownership of
land, alien children from the enjoyment of school privileges,
alien laborers from -working in factories, are overridden and
nullified by a treaty (as they may be) the constitution is not
violated. When in the exercise of the war power civilians are
prevented from enjoying rights indisputably theirs in time of
peace but which interfere with the successful prosecution of
the war, can it be said that their rights are unconstitutionally
invaded?
To state the question shortly: Is congress, in the exercise
of the war power, limited by the Bill of Rights? Or, let us
subdivide the question, and inquire specifically:
4 Mormon Church v. United States, (1890) 136 U. S. 1, (42), 34 L.
Ed. 481, 10 S. C. R. 792.
5Art. IV, Sec. 2.
6 Address before the American Society of International Law, April
19, 1907, 1 Am. J. Int. Law, 273, 278.
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(1)

May Congress try by court-martial, without a jury,

and punish any person not in the military or naval service for
an act prejudicial to the conduct of the war?
(2) May Congress abridge fhe freedom of speech or of the
press where it hampers the exercise of the war power by discouraging enlistment, or weakens the morale of the armies by
maligning the military chiefs?
(3)
May Congress fix the prices of commodities and ser.vices, compel the sale of goods and the performance of services
in war time in ways which in peace time would be a deprival
of liberty and property without due process?
(4) May Congress by law compel civilians to labor on
ships or railroads in transporting troops and munitions? This
question perhaps is not fairly embraced within the general
problem under discussion, as it may be claimed that such persons, when their labor is commandeered for the transportation
of troops or military supplies, are in the military service as
much as soldiers.
A somewhat similar question seems to have been raised by
the conviction before a court-martial of Charles E. Gerlach J
second officer of an army transport, for refusing to serve as a
lookout for submarines and torpedoes while his ship was in
the European danger zone. Gerlach was sentenced to five
years at hard labor in army disciplinary barracks, in spite of
his claim that his constitutional rights were violated in that
he was a civilian and therefore not amenable to court-martial.
He claimed that though a civilian officer in the transport service, he was returning to the United States merely as a passenger. The government contended that he was still amenable
to orders, although he was not on the ship to which he was
regularly detailed.
Doubtless all these questions may be considered as embraced within the first, since if Congress has the power, as a
war measure, to provide for the trial of a civilian before a
military tribunal, without presentment by a grand jury or
trial by a petit jury, and may authorize such a tribunal to
order him hanged or shot, all the other guaranties of the constitution must be regarded as intended for a time of peace only,
and as in abeyance during war. It is of course, predicated,
7

See New York Times, Nov. 24, 1917.
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that the act for which the civilian in question is tried and
punished is committed in a place where no actual fighting with
the enemy is going on, and where the courts are open and
performing their usual functions, for otherwise the question is
not debatable; it must also be assumed that it is in a place
where military preparations are being made, such as the enlistment, training, or transportation of troops, or the manufacture,
storage, or transportation of military supplies; but it would
be difficult to find any place in the United States at the present
time in which some or all of these things are not being done.
The question is precisely that which confronted the Supreme Court of the United States in the celebrated Milligan
Case.8 Milligan, an American citizen, not a member of the
army or navy, nor in any way connected with the service, was
seized in 1864 in his home in Indiana by order of the military
commandant of the district of Indiana, confined in a military
prison at Indianapolis, tried by a military commission convened by General Hovey's order and condemned to death by
hanging. The charges were conspiracy against the government of the United States, affording aid and comfort to the
rebels, inciting insurrection, disloyal practices, and violation
of the laws of war. The sentence was approved by the President and on the point of being carried into effect when he was
discharged upon habeas corpus by the Supreme Court of the
United States. All of the justices agreed that he was entitled
to be discharged because the act of Congress required that
military prisoners other than prisoners of war, citizens of
states in which the administration of the laws had continued
unimpaired in the federal courts, should be entitled to their
discharge if they were not indicted within twenty days after
their arrest. The federal courts had been in the undisturbed
performance of their functions in Indiana, and Milligan had
not been indicted within the time named. Technically his right
to discharge was clear. But the court went further, and declared-unnecessarily so far as Milligan was concerned-that
the military tribunals organized during the civil war, in states
not invaded and not engaged in rebellion, in which the federal
courts were open and in the proper and unobstructed exercise
of their judicial functions, had no jurisdiction to try, convict,
or sentence for any criminal offense a citizen who was neither a
8 Ex parte Milligan, (1866) 4 Wall. 2, 18 L. Ed. 281.
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resident of a rebellious state nor a prisoner of war nor a person
in the military or naval service; and that Congress could not
invest them with any such power. The Court declared that
"martial law cannot arise from a threatened invasion. The
necessity must be actual and present, the invasion real, such as
effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil administration."
Four of the justices dissented, among them Chief Justice
Chase, declaring that Congress had the power though not exercised to authorize military commissions. Both sides regarded
the question as of momentous importance for the future. To
the majority the concession of such a power to the military
would one day mean fhe overthrow of constitutional freedom;
to the minority, its denial meant the paralysis of the military
authority in the hour of public danger. The case was decided
in 1866, after the exigency of the war had passed away. It is
likely to come up again before the same court, now that a war
of vastly greater magnitude is upon us.
If it be true that the acts of military officers in making the
arrest of such a person and of the military commission in trying
him and in carrying the sentence into effect, are all null-and
void, the approval of those acts by the president is of no avail
to protect the officers; and if as seems probable, even statutes
of indemnification by Congress are unconstitutional, it is easy
to see how loath army officers are likely to be to act with
vigor and promptitude in districts where there is no actual invasion but where wrecks, fires and explosions are paralyzing
military preparations and an insidious propaganda is poisoning
the springs of national patriotism.
The essence of the question seems to be this: admitting
that in any possible case Congress may declare martial law, is
the right founded upon the constitution or upon necessity? If
the former, it is a mere exercise of the war power and Congress
is the sole judge of the imminence of the danger; it is a
political and not a judicial question; the power existing, the
courts cannot inquire whether the facts justify its exercise
either in the actual theater of war or in places remote from the
field of action. If it rests upon necessity alone, and not upon
the constitution, it is a judicial question, and every soldier
when held to answer after the war for his conduct must be
prepared to justify himself before a jury, not by the command
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of his military superiors nor by the act of Congress, but solely
by the necessity which alone gave his act validity. In the
Milligan Case the majority of the judges took the latter position, the minority the former.
It is asserted that the war power is subject to certain constitutional limitations. The fundamental rights of the citizen
as against the exercise of arbitrary power are secured to him
by the clauses of the constitution guaranteeing to him freedom
of speech and of the press, freedom of assembly for the purpose
of petition, trial by jury, immunity from unreasonable searches
and seizures and from prosecution for a capital or otherwise
infamous crime unless on presentment by a grand jury, except
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia,
when in actual service in time of war or public danger. In
general, he is not to be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law. It is said that all of these guaranties are swept away if a citizen who is not a member of the
military or naval service can be tried before a military tribunal
unknown to the judicial system of the country, and condemned
and executed under the authority of the President. The
authority to set aside these express provisions of the constitution must be found if at all in the war power, and in that particular exercise of the war power known as martial law.
Martial law must be distinguished from (a) military law
and (b) military government. The former is that body of
specific rules governing the army and navy, as a separate
community, which may be described as the military state. It
applies both at home and abroad, in peace and in war. It is
partly written and partly unwritten. Its written part is composed of the statutory code or Articles of War, other statutory
enactments relating to the discipline of the army, the army
regulations, and general and special orders.9 Persons entering
' Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents, II, 2nd ed., p. 1, 4.
"Military law is as clearly defined as any system of statute, common, or civil law. It consists of the Articles of War enacted by Congress, the regulations and instructions sanctioned by the President,
orders of commanding officers, and certain usages and customs constituting the unwritten or common law of the army." Ex parte Bright,
(1874) 1 Utah 145. The persons subject to military law are not merely
the officers and soldiers of the army, and the militia when called into
active service, but may include civilian employees serving with the
army, in the Indian country, during offensive operations against the
Indians. 14 Op. Atty. Gen. 22, (1872). A clerk in the employ of a
paymaster in the army. In re Thomas, (U. S. C. C. 1869) Fed. Cases
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the military state subject themselves to this jurisdiction and no
longer are entitled to the protection, in respect of criminal procedure, which the constitution guarantees to civilians. The
tribunals by which this law is enforced are not a part of the
judicial system, and their judgments are not subject to review
under certiorari or habeas corpus by the Supreme Court.'"
It is not arbitrary in character but is as definite and precise as
the body of law governing civilians. It does not supersede the
civil laws in the sense of exempting the soldier from liability
to trial and punishment in the ordinary courts the same as
civilians. Military government is "that dominion exercised in
war by a belligerent power over territory of'the enemy invaded
and occupied by him and over the inhabitants thereof." In
his dissenting opinion in Ex parte Milligan, Chief Justice Chase
described it as "military jurisdiction to be exercised by the
military commander under the direction of the President, in
time of foreign war without the boundaries of the United
States, or in time of rebellion and civil war within states and
districts occupied by rebels treated as belligerents." In the
exercise of military government, the commander may adopt,
for the purposes of temporary civil administration, the existing
system of the country, including its laws and courts, but the
jurisdiction of such laws and courts is not ex proprio vigore,
but solely by virtue of the authority conferred by him. It is
therefore the arbitrary will of the commander; it may be suspended, modified, or superseded at his discretion. Military
government is a species of civil government existing under the
sanction of the war power in the enemy's country-foreign, if
the war be foreign, in occupied rebellious territories if it be a
civil war.
No. 13, 888. The Articles of War, adopted Aug. 29, 1916, C. 418, Sec.
3, declares that among the persons subject to military law are: "d.
All retainers to the camp and all persons accompanying or serving
with the armies of the United States without the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, and in time of war all such retainers and
persons accompanying or serving with the armies of the United States
in the field, both within and without the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, though not otherwise subject to these Articles." 4 U. S.
Compiled Stat. Annotated, Sec. 2308a, p. 3950. It is of course true,
as a general rule, that a citizen of the United States, not in the military service, is not amenable to a court-martial, because he is not subject to the Articles of War. Smith v. Shaw, (1815) 12 Johns. (N. Y.)
257; Ex parte Merryman, (1861) Taney (U. S. C. C.) 246, Fed Cas.
No. 9487, Taney, C. J.; In re Kemp, (1863) 16 Wis. 359.
10 Ex parte Vallandigham, (1863) 1 Wall. 243, 17 L. Ed. 589.
"1Winthrop, II, 1245.
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Martial law, on the other hand, is a jurisdiction exercised
over civilians, at home, within a territory not rebellious, not
occupied by the army. It does not apply to the army nor to
enemies. It is established not by military occupation, but by
proclamation. It is accompanied either by an express or tacit
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, since its exercise
cannot tolerate the supervision of the regular courts.
The distinction between military law and martial law has
often been confused. Bfackstone- seems to confuse it. He
says :12

"Martial law, which is built on no settled principles, but is
entirely arbitrary in its decisions, is, as Sir Matthew Hale
observed, in truth and reality no law, but something indulged
rather than allowed as a law. The necessity of order and
discipline in an army is the only thing which can give it
countenance; and therefore it ought not to be permitted. in
time of peace, when the King's courts are open for all persons
to receive justice according to the laws of the land."
But martial law, as at present understood, has nothing to
do with the order and discipline in an army; it is more nearly
an application of military government to persons and property
at home, in time of war and within the theater of war, or so
near to it that the unrestricted operation of the ordinary municipal laws would impair the efficiency of the exercise of the war
power. The commander, in this discussion, must be understood to be the President, acting of course under the authority
of Congress, in whom the war power is constitutionally vested.
"Martial law," says Professor Dicey," "ih the proper sense
of that term, in which it means the suspension of ordinary law
and the temporary government of a country or parts of it by
military tribunals, is unknown to the law of England. We have
nothing equivalent to what is called in France 'declaration of
a state of siege,' under which the authority ordinarily vested
in the civil power for the maintenance of order and police
passes entirely to the army." In the sense that every subject,
whether a civilian or -a soldier, policeman or private citizen,
has the right and owes the duty to assist in putting down
breaches of the peace, repelling invasion, quelling riots, and
12 Blackstone, Comm., I, *413. For discussion of distinction between martial law and military law, see 1 Cooley's Blackstone, *413,
note.
13 Dicey, The Law of the Constitution, 4th ed., p. 268.
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restoring the supremacy of law, this right and duty is recognized by the common law. 14 But considered as a part of the
common law, every officer, soldier, policeman, and civilian is
liable to be held accountable for any unnecessary or excessive
use of force, before the civil courts. 15 Dicey"6 well observes
that "the estimate of what constitutes necessary force formed
by a judge and jury, sitting in quiet and safety after the suppression of a riot, may differ from the judgment formed by a
general or magistrate, who is surrounded by armed rioters,
and knows that at any moment the riot may become a formidable rebellion, and the rebellion if unchecked become a successful revolutiorr."
After the decision of the Supreme Court in the- Milligan
The court held
Case, General Hovey was sued by Milligan.
that he was liable, but the jury considering all the circum7
stances, gave only nominal damages.'
14Dicey, p. 269.

15 Rex v. Pinney, (1832) 5 C. & P. 254, 3 St. Tr. (N. S.) 11.
16 Dicey, p. 271.
17 Milligan v. Hovey, (1871)

3 Biss. (U. S. C. C.) 13, Fed. Cas. 9605.
See also, Griffin v. ,Wilcox, (1863) 21 Ind. 372, 386, in which the Indiana court holds unconstitutional the Act of Congress, passed in
1863, exempting any officer from civil or criminal liability for any act
done under the order of the President or by his authority, Major
Lyon, at Indianapolis, in 1863, by military order prohibited the sale
of liquor to soldiers. PlAintiff was arrested by defendant for violating the order. The court says: "The war power of the President,
then, may be stated thus: He has a right to govern through his military officers by martial law when and where the civil power of the
United States is suspended by force. In all other times and places
the civil excludes the martial law-excludes government by the war
power. Where force prevails martial law may be exercised. But in
all parts of the country where the courts are open, an-d the civil power
is not expelled by force, the constitution and laws rule, the President
is, but the President, and no citizen, not connected with the army, can
be punished by the 'military power of the United States, nor is he
amenable to military orders. If, in such parts of the country, men
commit crimes defined by law, they must be punished according to
the constitution and the law, in the civil courts. If, in such parts of
the country, men have not perpetrated acts constituting, in law,
crimes, their arrest, trial, and punishment, by military courts, is but a
mode of applying lynch law; is, in short, mob violence. This is so
unless the old English Tory doctrine of government is secretly included in our constitution. That doctrine, 's expressed by Filmer,
is that 'a man is bound to obey the King's command against the law;
nay, in' some cases, against divine laws.'" This is precisely the position afterwards taken by the majority in the Milligan case. So far as
this case holds unconstitutional an act of Congress depriving a citizen of all redress for an illegal arrest, there can be no doubt of its
correctness. Cooley, Const. Lim., 7th ed., 518, note; Johnson v.
Jones, (1867) 44 Ill. 142, 92 Am. Dec. 159. In support of the doctrine
that the arrest was illegal, see Ex parte McDonald, (1914) 49 Mont.
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The kind of martial law sought to be enforced by the
military commission in the Milligan Case corresponded to that
which prevails in France under a declaration of a "state .of
siege," in which the constitutional guarantees are suspended,
the military authority has the right to make searches, by day
and night, in the domiciles of citizens; to remove persons
accused and individuals who do not have their domicile in the
places which are subject to the state of siege, to order the
surrender of arms and munitions, and to interdict publication
and meetings deemed of a nature to incite disorder.1 3 "This
kind of martial law," says Professor Dicey,19 "is in England
utterly unknown to the constitution. Soldiers may suppress a
riot as they may resist an invasion, they may fight rebels just
as they may fight foreign enemies, but they have no right
under the law to inflict punishment for riot or rebellion." This
can mean nothing more, however, than that such things cannot
be done without the authority of an act of Parliament; for the
recent history of England has abundantly demonstrated that
under proper parliamentary authority anything may be done.
During the Boer war it became necessary on account of the
presence of a disaffected population, to proclaim martial law
in Cape Colony in districts remote from actual hostilities. One
Marais was arrested without a warrant under instructions from
the military authorities, and detained without trial. He petitioned the supreme court of the Cape of Good Hope for release
on the ground that his arrest and imprisonment were in violation of the fundamental liberties secured to subjects of His
Majesty. The court refused his petition on the ground that
martial law having been proclaimed in that district, the court
ought not to go into the necessity for the proclamation. The
Privy Council denied his petition for leave to appeal, laying
down the rule that where actual war is raging, acts done by
the military authorities are not justiciable. by ordinary tribunals, and that the fact that for some purposes some tribunals
have been permitted to pursue their ordinary course in the
454, 143 Pac. 947, L. R. A. 1915B 988; Francis v. Smith, (1911) 142 Ky.
232, 134 S.W. 484, L. R. A. 1915A 1141. For elaborate note on Civil
or Criminal Liability of Soldier or Militiaman for Injury to Person or
Property see Ann. Cas. 1917C 8.
18 Dicey, p. 272.
29 Dicey, p. 273.
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district in which martial law has been proclaimed is not conclusive that war is not raging.2 0
The extent to which the exigencies of the present war have
driven the British government is shown by the fact that the
courts are sanctioning the internment-that is, imprisonmentof civilian Germans long resident in England, declaring them
prisoners of war, and refusing them the ancient privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus. The difficulty of fixing any exact limit
to the "actual theater of war" is shown in the opinion of the
court in Rex. v. Superintendent Vine Street Police Station.2
"War at the present moment is not as it was in the olden
times, confined to easily, ascertained limits. The inventions
and discoveries of recent years, and especially the existing
means of communication, have so widened the field of possible
hostilities that there is scarcely any limit on the earth, in the
air, or in the waters which it is possible to put upon the exercise of acts of hostility, and real danger to the realm may
therefore exist, although impossible of discovery, at distances
far from where the actual clash of arm is taking place. In
addition to this, methods of warfare, or methods ancillary to
warfare, have come into practice on the part of our foes which
involve the honeycombing of the realm with enemies, not only
to obtain and despatch information, but to serve pur'poses directly helpful to the conduct of enterprises either actually
warlike or eminently calculated to assist the prosecution of
the war."
In that case the court made it very emphatic that they were
dealing only with the case of alien enemies; but in January,
1916, they sustained an executive order of a very much more
drastic character. A regulation had been issued under the
Defense of the Realm Act, 1914, (authorizing the Council to
issue regulations for securing the public safety), "that where
on recommendation of competent naval or military authorities
S

.

.it

appears to the Secretary of State that

.

.

.

it is

expedient in view of the hostile origin or associations of any
person that he shall be subjected to such obligations and restrictions as are hereinafter mentioned, the Secretary of State
may by order require that person forthwith

terned."

.

.

.

to be in-

This regulation was held not to be ultra vires.2 2

In

Ex parte Marais, [1902] A. C. 109, 85 L. T. 734.
Rex. v. Superintendent Vine St. Police Station, (1915) 32 Times
L. R. 3.
22Rex v. Halliday, (1916) 32 Times L. R. 245; affirmed, [1916] 1
K. B. 738, 114 L. T. 303, 32 T. L. R. 301.
20
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the case cited, one Zadig, a naturalized British subject, was
confined in an internment camp, and a rule nisi to the commandant to show cause why habeas corpus should not issue
was refused. The Attorney General said: "The power to
intern a British subject had been acted upon in a great number
of cases, and a considerab'le number of persons who claimed
British nationality had been interned and were detained at the
present moment." Lord Chief Justice Reading said that under
this act trials might be had by court-martial, "thus making
persons subject, in certain circumstances, to martial law. ' 23
In debate in the House of Commons March 2, 1916, 24 the
Home Secretary, defending the exercise of quasi martial law
under the conditions existing in the-present war, stated that
there were at the time sixty-nine persons under restraint who
were technically British subjects but who were suspect because
of hostile origin or associations. Some of them were persons
against whom it would be difficult if not impossible to frame a
legal indictment upon which they could be brought to trial.
In other countries, he said, such cases were dealt with under
martial law, but the British government considered that to
establish martial law would be going beyond what was necessary. There had been no suspension of the habeas corpus act,
and the particular Home Office regulation under the Defense
of the Realm Act to which exception had been taken had been
pronounced in accordance with the law by the seven justices
of the High Court of Justice and three lords justices of the
Court of Appeal.
There is a considerable difference between merely interning
for the period of the war persons suspected of hostile intentions, and trying a civilian as for a crime and executing him
by the authority of a military commission, as in the Milligan
Case. But if the power exists to suspend the ordinary laws
and the jurisdiction of the civil courts under the war power, it
would seem to follow that military necessity might justify the
infliction of punishment as well as mere detention.
It is said that the military commander may proclaim martial
law "in time of war" within "the actual theater of war ;" and
time of war is said to mean, when the ordinary courts are not
in the usual and open exercise of their functions. In the case
23 Id.
24

See New York Times, March 4, 1916.
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of military government of occupied foreign territory, as has
been seen, the military commander may think proper to permit
the courts of the country to exercise their usual functions, but
in so doing they act merely as licensees of the military authority. In like manner, after a proclamation of martial law, in
territory where no actual fighting is going on, the commanderin-chief may permit the courts to exercise their usual functions
within such limits as he may prescribe. In doing so the courts
are. the licensees of the military authority, but this does not
authorize them to supervise the acts of the power to which
they owe their existence.

In the Marais Case25 the Lord Chan-

cellor said: "Where acts of war are in question the military tribunals alone are competent to deal with such questions." And
again

:26

"The truth is that no doubt has ever existed that where war
actually prevails the ordinary courts have no jurisdiction over
the military courts. Doubtless cases of difficulty arise when
the fact of a state of rebellion or insurrection is not clearly
established. And it may even be a question whether a mere
riot, or disturbance neither so serious nor so extensive as really
to amount to a war at all, has not been treated with excessive
severity, and whether the intervention of the military force was
necessary; but once let the fact of actual war be established,
and there is a universal concensus of opinion that the civil
courts have no jurisdiction to call in question the propriety of
the action of military authorities."
War having been declared to exist between the United
States and Germany, must the military authority wait before
proclaiming martial law until a hostile army has actually effected a landing on American soil, or may it do so in the vicinity of arsenals, munition factories, storehouses of munitions,
flour mills, ship yards, wireless stations, bridges, railway lines,
training camps, internment camps, centers of population in
which there are evidences of disaffection? If the president
proclaims martial law in a certain place, does the proclamation
conclusively establish the existence of a state of war in that
place, so as to protect an officer carrying into effect the sentence of a military commission? Sir Frederick Pollock 27 thinks
that an Order in Council could neither add to nor derogate
from the authority of a magistrate in the exercise of martial
25 Note 20, supra.
26
27

Ex parte Marais, [1902] A. C. 109 (115).
18 Law Q. Rev. 156; see also p. 158.
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law. On the other hand, in a case arising in Colorado28 where
a person brought suit against the governor for causing his
arrest and detention during a period of riot and disturbance,
the Supreme Court of the United States said: "It is admitted,
as it must be, that the governor's declaration that a state of
insurrection existed is conclusive of that fact." It has been
held in an unanimous opinion by the Supreme Court of the
United States that when a question arises as to the existence
of an exigency requiring the calling of the militia into the
active service of the United States, the authority to so decide
belongs exclusively to the President, and his decision is con29
clusive upon all other persons.
It is true the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus cannot
be suspended, "unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion,
the public safety may require it ;-30 but "invasion" is not limited to the actual landing of a hostile army. The danger of
such invasion, it should seem, would justify the suspension of
the writ. But the majority of the Supreme Court in the
Milligan Case3 ' said that martial law cannot arise from a
threatened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion real, such as effectually closes the courts and
deposes the civil administration." The Court was not speaking
of the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus but of the exercise of martial law; but in either case, knowing what we do of
the destructiveness of the submarine, of the almost incredible
efficiency of the aeroplane in securing and of the wireless telegraph in transmitting intelligence, of the effectiveness of explosives, all these undreamed of by the judges of that period,
it is hard to imagine any court at the present day declaring
that the military authority must wait until a hostile army has
actually landed on our coast before taking necessary steps to
guard itself against the activities of secret enemies within
our gates. It is equally absurd to suppose that a bench of
judges would assume to pass upon a question of military
necessity, the elements of which in the nature of things they
32
can know next to nothing about.
28 Moyer v. Peabody, (1908) 212 U. S. 78, 29 S. C. R. 235, per
Holmes J.
29 Martin v. Mott, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U. S.) 19, 6 L. Ed. 537.
3o Const. Art. 1, Sec. 9.
31 (1866) 4 Wall. 2 (127), 18 L. Ed. 281.
32 When the President, under the authority of Congress, calls forth
the militia "to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections,
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The war power is vested in Congress alone, or in Congress
and the President. It is submitted that when the President,
under the authority of Congress, during war, proclaims martial
law in any part of the United States, no court will enter upon
a judicial investigation of the necessity of so doing or question
the validity of the act.
It must not be forgotten that the law military applies only
to members of the military system, while martial law applies
to civilians: yet Article 82 of. the Articles of War 33 covers the
case of spies, who are dealt with thus:
"Art. 82. Spies. Any person who in time of war shall be
found lurking or acting as a spy in or about any of the fortifications, posts, quarters, or encampments of any of the armies
of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by general
court-martial or by a military commission, and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death."
Winthrop 34 says that "To be charged with the offense of
spying it is not essential that the accused be a member of the
army or a resident of the country of the enemy; he may be a
citizen or even a soldier of the nation or people against whom
he offends and at the time of his offense legally within their
If the statute quoted is constitutional, then any
lines."
person accused of the specific offense of spying is not entitled
to the guaranties of the constitution; and the reason must be
that the particular offense is so peculiarly fatal to the successful exercise of the war power that it must be dealt with in a
prompt and summary manner, unknown to the procedure of
the civil courts. Incidentally, it is an interesting speculation
why the Articles of War,3 5 which in every other respect purport to be limited in their application to members of the miliand repel invasions," his determination of the existence of the exigency

is conclusive upon the courts. Martin v. Mott, (1827) 12 Wheat. (U. S.)
19. The authority of the President to call out the militia and establish martial law was before the Supreme Court in Luther v. Borden,
(1848) 7 How. 1, 12 L. Ed. 581, Taney, C. J., significantly asked:
"After the President has acted and called out the militia, is a circuit
court of the United States authorized to inquire whether his decision
was right? . . , It is said that this power in the President is dangerous to liberty and may be abused. All power may be abused if
placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think, to
point out any other hands in which the power would be more safe,
and at the same time equally effectual."
33 4 U. S. Compiled Stat. Annotated,. 1916, Sec. 2308a, p. 3983.
34 Winthrop, II, 2nd ed., 1194.
"3See note 33, supra.
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tary establishment, should, in this particular instance, be extended to cover persons in no way connected with the army.
But whatever be the explanation, the question immediately
arises, if Congress may confer upon courts-martial or military
commissions jurisdiction to try and hang spies, why not train
wreckers, bomb planters, incendiaries, food poisoners, disease
spreaders, inciters to desertion? If it be said that military.
necessity dictates the summary trial of spies in disregard of
the constitutional guaranties, may not the same military necessity apply in the other cases mentioned? And if it may, in
whom does the constitution lodge the responsibility of determining when that necessity arises-in those who wield the
war power, or in the courts? Which is likely to be the better
judge?
That precisely similar emergencies arose during the civil
war is well illustrated by the following quotation from Winthrop :36
"In the leading cases of Beall and Kennedy, though the
accused were charged and convicted inter alia as spies, their
offenses were rather or mainly those of violators of the laws
of war as prowlers (Lieber's Instructions, Sec. 84) or guerrilas;
the crimes of Beall consisting mostly in seizing and destroying
steamers and their cargoes on Lake Erie, and attempting to
throw passenger trains off the track in the state of New York,
in September and December, 1864; and the principal crime of
Kennedy being his taking part in the attempt to burn the city
of New York by setting fire to Barnum's museum and ten
hotels on the night of November 25, 1864."
War-traitors, 37 if captured by the military authorities, are
liable to be condemned to death in the exercise of martial law,
or by the law military. The inference inevitably suggested is
this: if the constitutional rights of the spy are not violated by
his trial before a court-martial, it must be because the state
36Winthrop, II, 2nd ed., 1196-97. Sec. 84 of Instructions for the
Government of Armies of the United States in the Field, prepared by
Francis Lieber, and issued under the authority of the government
during the civil war, is as follows: "Armed prowlers, by whatever
names they may be called, or persons of the enemies' territory, who
steal within the lines of the hostile army, for the purpose of robbing,
killing, or of destroying bridges, roads, or canals, or of robbing or
destroying the mail, or of cutting the telegraph wires, are not entitled
to the privileges of the prisoners of war." Sec. 89: "If a citizen of
the United States obtains information in a legitimate manner and betrays it to the enemy, be he a military or civil officer, or a private citizen, he shall suffer death."
37 See Lieber's Instructions, Secs. 90, 91. 92.
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of war and the exercise of the war power has temporarily suspended those rights. Are the rights of the bomb planter, the
train wrecker, the incendiary, the food poisoner, the disease
spreader, the inciter to desertion, more sacred than those of
the spy?
Those who adopt the view ,of the majority in the Milligan
Case admit that in the "actual theater of war" martial law -may
be legally applied to civilians. But there is no more warrant
in the constitution for the exercise of such authority within
the theater of war than without. If the letter of the Bill of
Rights be the test, a civilian, within the lines in Maryland
during Lee's invasion, caught setting fire to military stores
would have been entitled to jury trial. The fifth and sixth
amendments entitle all persons to a jury trial except those in
the military or naval service. The admission just mentioned
is a recognition that the constitution was never meant to cover
such a case. But is the exercise of martial law in such a case
extra-constitutional and therefore illegal? It seems very plain
that it is perfectly legal, because the state of war has suspended
the fifth and sixth amendments, at least in "the actual theater
of war." But the constitution uses no such phrase; it was
invented by those who saw that in such a situation individualism must yield to the welfare of the state. And the phrase
itself has no legal meaning; it involves a vast complex of
technical military science, of secret information jealously
guarded, of plans concerted by the government and its allies,
of projects of possible invasion and of intrigue by the enemy
which must be foreseen and thwarted. The folly of submitting
such a question to the decision of a jury is too evident to need
comment.
To the timid who, in order to justify martial law, require
that it be exercised only in "the actual theater of war," it
should be sufficient answer that that phrase embraces every
place in which any military activities are going forward.
If
they insist that there must be actual invasion, it fairly may be
said that every ship flying the United States flag is United
States territory, and an attack on such a ship is as much an
invasion of our territory as the bombardment of an American
port.
As is indicated at the beginning of this article, the questions
growing out of martial law are closely bound up with questions
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involving other constitutional rights, e. g., the right not to be
deprived of liberty or property without due process of law.
This right is as much guaranteed by the constitution as the
right to trial by jury. In the presence of war the two must
stand or fall together. Can the citizen be compelled to sell
his food products at a price to be fixed by law, or punished
criminally for selling at a higher price? The determination of
this question will test the scope of the war power as well as
any other.
In the case of Farcy v. Burvett,3 8 the High Court of Australia determined that the Commonwealth of Australia does
possess this power in time of war, although in time of peace
the constitution reserves any such power to the states. The
legislation in question was adopted to subserve the interests
of the civil population, and its bearing upon the maintenance
of armies and the conduct of the war was only indirect and
incidental. The court in substance holds that the line of
cleavage between state and federal power which obtains in
time of peace is not binding when the very existence of the
commonwealth is imperiled by war; that the power and duty
of national defense is paramount; and that the system of
checks and balances devised for a time of peace is temporarily
suspended because the "organic power of defense" is supreme
and commensurate with the peril, as Parliament sees the peril.
This power, granted by the constitution itself, "is a power to
command, control, organize and regulate, for the purpose of
guarding against that peril, the whole resources of the continent, living and inert, and the activities of every inhabitant of
the territory. The problem of national defense is not confined
to operations on the battle field or the deck of a man-of-war;
its factors enter into every phase of life, and embrace the cooperation of every individual with all that he possesses-his
property, his energy, his life itself

.

.

."

And in the midst

of a struggle of the gigantic proportions of the present worldcontest, the question of necessity is declared to be one for the
legislature and the executive and not for the court.
It was held by the majority in the Milligan Case that martial law is "confined to the locality of actual war," and that it
"Ccan never exist when the courts are open and in the proper
38 (1916)

21 C. L. R. 433. For a discussion of this case, see 2
132.
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and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction." A decision on
so momentous a matter by a bare majority cannot be regarded
as settling it. The opinion of the four dissenting judges,
written by the Chief Justice, is that the fact that the courts are
open is not conclusive since they "might be open and unobstructed in the execution of their functions and yet wholly
incompetent to avert threatened danger or to punish with
adequate promptitude and certainty the guilty." Even in the
most critical periods of war it may be possible to keep the
courts open for the administration of ordinary justice; but
when the military authority permits the court to sit in a district
where martial law has been proclaimed, and the writ of habeas
corpus is temporarily suspended, whatever functions the court
may exercise are permissive only. If it should become necessary, in the opinion of Congress and the President, to place
New York harbor under martial law, and suspend therein the
writ of habeas corpus, it ought not to be necessary to close up
the courts entirely in order to create a condition in which the
military authority will not be interfered with by the courts.
If in such an eventuality a civilian should be arrested while
endeavoring to plant a bomb in the hold of an army transport,
it is submitted that the question whether he shall be tried before a military commission or indicted by a federal grand jury
is wholly a matter for Congress and the President to determine.
There are those who think that to suspend during a period
of martial law certain individual liberties is equivalent to suspending the whole constitution and handing the country over
to a military dictator. But this involves a fundamental misconception. No one would seriously claim that the military
authority should be placed above the constitution. In providing for the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus the
constitution does not decree its own abolition; and when it
provides for the temporary suspension of the individual rights
which the habeas corpus was designed to protect until the ship
of state emerges from the danger zone, the constitution merely
shifts the responsibility for safeguarding the interests of the
39
state and its citizens from one set of officers to another.
39 Moyer v. Peabody, (1908) 212 U. S. 78 (85), 29 S. C. R. 235, 53
L Ed. 410. The Court in this case says: "When it comes to a deci-

sion by the head of the State upon a matter involving its life, the
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Every department of the government is as much subject to the
constitution as before, but certain rights of the individual are
40
for the time being subordinated to the safety of the state.
If-as seems probable-the fate of democracy itself is involved in the present war, it is evident that the ability or inability of democracy to place all its resources at the disposal
of its leaders will be the determining factor in the struggle.
This is autocracy's supreme merit. If it be the true meaning
of the constitution that the war power has been fettered by
provisos which put the liberty of the citizen above the safety
of the state, then either the experiment of self-government will
prove a failure, or the chosen leaders of the people must when
necessary disregard mere paper barriers. Unquestionably the
war-leaders will use every weapon within reach, and it would
be wiser to adopt that interpretation of the fundamental law
which legalizes whatever imperative necessity compels, than
to endeavor to put bounds to that which is essentially absolute
and unlimited.
HENRY
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ordinary rights of individuals must yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process." Per Holmes, J.
40 For exhaustive discussions of the subject of this article, and supporting the opposite view, see Willoughby, Constitutional Law, II,
Secs. 723-737; Lieber, "The Justification of Martial Law" 163 N.A.
Rev. 549; Professor Ballentine, "Martial Law," 12 Col. L.-Rev. 529.
The discussion in this article has been purposely limited to problems raised in a regularly declared war, as distinguished from the
exercise of martial law by state authorities for the purpose of quelling
riots and suppressing local disorder not amounting to civil war. The
scope of the war power under the latter circumstances is probably
greatly restricted by the exclusive constitutional grants to the federal
government, and by the fact that such a disturbance can be "war"
only in a very qualified sense. That the exercise of martial law in
times of merely constructive war has been very greatly extended in
recent years may be seen in the following cases: Moyer v. Peabody,
supra; Hatfield v. Graham, (1914) 73 W. Va. 759, 81 S. E. 533, Ann.
Cas. 1917C, 1; Mays v. Brown, (1912) 71 W. Va. 519, 77 S. E. 243, 45
L. R. A. (N. S.) 996. As illustrating the utter paralysis of the military authority resulting from an application of the doctrine of the Milligan Case, to local disorders, see Franks v. Smith, (1911) 142 Ky. 232,
134 S.W. 484, L.R.A. 1915A 1141.
In accord with the views of the author, see valuable article by
Geerge S. Wallace, The Need, the Propriety, and Basis of Martial
Law, Jour. Arh. Inst. of Crim. L. & C. VIII, 167. 406.

